Physical logical security convergence has garnered increased attention over the past year, and we've had countless conversations with both IT departments and physical security teams about the people, process and technology issues that come with the territory. Integrating teams and policy, not just the technology, needs to be well thought out. Increasingly, the path of our conversations with prospects and customers interested in converging physical and logical access focuses on where to start that type of project.

The New York Times recently posted an article decrying passwords as an inadequate defense mechanism for security today in a wave of identity theft occurrences. The article goes on to push a cryptography-based approach to log-on systems, touting ‘information cards' that rely on the computer handshake between machines to authenticate a user, or in this case, a site visitor. The article goes on to rail against the OpenID initiative because of its password-driven approach to SSO to access OpenID-enabled Web sites.

Recently, according to a Federal Computer Week article, the Drug Enforcement Administration proposed rules to allow e-Prescribing of controlled substances, such as painkillers and stimulants. The proposed rules require doctors to use two forms of identification for each transmission of e-Prescriptions for controlled substances in addition to an annual audit of each system by a certified public accountancy. Under current rules, doctors may use e-Prescribing for most prescriptions but must sign a written prescription for Schedule II controlled substances, such as Nembutal, OxyContin and opium. The DEA rule, if it becomes final, would allow doctors to use the same system for generating and transmitting all prescriptions.

Risk management seems to be the conversation du jour. I was just a the Lenel Paradigm Conference in Rochester with some of their leading security consultants and the topic that constantly came up was Risk and how security practioners needed to understand the business drivers around mitigating risk. With access and authentication management-centric security breaches like LendingTree and Societe Generale making headlines and compliance requirements mandating greater information security, how does one even begin to understand what a company needs to do?

Full disclosure: I'm just a medium-sized hospital's IT security guy. I've had Imprivata'sESSO appliance (three of them actually, a pair of HA, and a test box) up and running, happily, for about three years. I was invited by Imprivata and Ping Identity to participate in a panel discussion at the SSO Summit held in Keystone, CO, on July 23-25 (http://www.ssosummit.com/). Andre Durand (Ping Identity) and friends put on a very nice event. There was a good blend of topics, from SSO-centric details, to Federation issues, and a mixture of interesting case studies to visionary presenters like John Haggard (independent security consultant and long-time IT mentor) and Gunnar Peterson (Arctec Group). The event was solid throughout, but to hear John and Gunnar speak about the important issues of the past and future of SSO and IT/Web security, made the event a powerful experience not to be missed.

In case you missed part 0 in this series, you may want to brush up on how a good IAAM system should work before reading on. 

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The hardest part of standing up an IAAM system is around the people and process, not the technology.  So, let’s start there because if we can’t get this done right, your IAAM project is going to fail.